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9 books match the query 'Separation of powers'

cover of Divided Power: The Presidency, Congress, and the Formation of American Foreign Policy

Divided Power

The Presidency, Congress, and the Formation of American Foreign Policy

Donald R. Kelley

University of Arkansas Press, 2005

Divided Power is a collection of eight original essays written for the Fulbright Institute of International Relations that focuses on timely yet unanswerable questions about the relationship between the executive and legislative branches in the formation of American foreign policy. In trying to answer questions about what the nation’s foreign policy is, and who has the upper hand in making it, these essays examine the struggle between the constant of the division of powers mandated by the Constitution (ambiguous though it may be) and the ever-changing political realities and conventional wisdoms of the day. Within that context, the authors also examine the society and culture in which those realities and wisdoms are nested. The goal of these essays is to offer a snapshot in time of the interaction of the executive and legislative branches in the shaping of our foreign policy, framed and informed by the intellectual and political realities that characterize the post–Cold War, post–September 11 world.
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cover of Madison's Nightmare: How Executive Power Threatens American Democracy

Madison's Nightmare

How Executive Power Threatens American Democracy

Peter M. Shane

University of Chicago Press, 2009

The George W. Bush administration’s ambitious—even breathtaking—claims of unilateral executive authority raised deep concerns among constitutional scholars, civil libertarians, and ordinary citizens alike. But Bush’s attempts to assert his power are only the culmination of a near-thirty-year assault on the basic checks and balances of the U.S. government—a battle waged by presidents of both parties, and one that, as Peter M. Shane warns in Madison’s Nightmare, threatens to utterly subvert the founders’ vision of representative government.

Tracing this tendency back to the first Reagan administration, Shane shows how this era of "aggressive presidentialism" has seen presidents exerting ever more control over nearly every arena of policy, from military affairs and national security to domestic programs. Driven by political ambition and a growing culture of entitlement in the executive branch—and abetted by a complaisant Congress, riven by partisanship—this presidential aggrandizement has too often undermined wise policy making and led to shallow, ideological, and sometimes outright lawless decisions. The solution, Shane argues, will require a multipronged program of reform, including both specific changes in government practice and broader institutional changes aimed at supporting a renewed culture of government accountability.

From the war on science to the mismanaged war on terror, Madison’s Nightmare outlines the disastrous consequences of the unchecked executive—and issues a stern wake-up call to all who care about the fate of our long democratic experiment.

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cover of Pack the Court!: A Defense of Supreme Court Expansion

Pack the Court!

A Defense of Supreme Court Expansion

Stephen M. Feldman

Temple University Press, 2021

The United States Supreme Court has numbered nine justices for the past 150 years. But that number is not fixed. With the Democrats controlling the House and Senate during the Biden presidency, they could add justices to the Supreme Court. But would court packing destroy the Court as an apolitical judicial institution? This is the crucial question Stephen Feldman addresses in his provocative book, Pack the Court! He uses a historical, analytical, and political argument to justify court-packing in general and Democratic court-packing more specifically.

Republicans and Democrats alike profess to worry that court-packing will destroy the legitimacy of the Supreme Court as a judicial institution by injecting politics into a purely legal adjudicative process. But as Feldman’s insightful book shows, law and politics are forever connected in judicial interpretation and decision making. Pack the Court! insists that court packing is not the threat to the Supreme Court’s institutional legitimacy that many fear. Given this, Feldman argues that Democrats should pack the Court while they have the opportunity. Doing so might even strengthen the American people’s faith in the Court.

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cover of Pivotal Politics: A Theory of U.S. Lawmaking

Pivotal Politics

A Theory of U.S. Lawmaking

Keith Krehbiel

University of Chicago Press, 1998

Politicians and pundits alike have complained that the divided governments of the last decades have led to legislative gridlock. Not so, argues Keith Krehbiel, who advances the provocative theory that divided government actually has little effect on legislative productivity. Gridlock is in fact the order of the day, occurring even when the same party controls the legislative and executive branches. Meticulously researched and anchored to real politics, Krehbiel argues that the pivotal vote on a piece of legislation is not the one that gives a bill a simple majority, but the vote that allows its supporters to override a possible presidential veto or to put a halt to a filibuster. This theory of pivots also explains why, when bills are passed, winning coalitions usually are bipartisan and supermajority sized. Offering an incisive account of when gridlock is overcome and showing that political parties are less important in legislative-executive politics than previously thought, Pivotal Politics remakes our understanding of American lawmaking.
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cover of Strategic Responsiveness: How Congress Confronts Presidential Power

Strategic Responsiveness

How Congress Confronts Presidential Power

Scott H. Ainsworth, Brian M. Harward, and Kenneth W. Moffett

University of Michigan Press, 2025

Because the constitutional separation of powers often leads to delay or obstruction rather than coordinated policymaking, U.S. presidents are increasingly acting unilaterally to move policy. With the issuance of executive orders, signing statements, and policy memoranda, unilateralism has become a defining feature of the American presidency. Can Congress effectively use checks and balances to counter presidential unilateralism? 

Strategic Responsiveness takes a theoretically developed and empirically oriented approach— situated within legal and historical contexts—to explore the system of separated powers. The authors find that Congress is not as weak as many perceive it to be and show how members of Congress often anticipate individualized policy loss and choose to respond. These policy struggles shape the constitutional order as surely as broad, statutory constraints might. While the aggrandizement of the presidency and the usurpation of congressional control are not countered, ordinary policy losses are. For members and senators, presidential overreach is fine as long as the policy wins continue, but policy losses may motivate members to reassert congressional prerogatives in policymaking through increased oversight. Strategic Responsiveness reveals how profoundly important policy-level disputes are in the politics of maintaining a particular constitutional order.
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cover of Supreme Court and Judicial Choice: The Role of Provisional Review in a Democracy

Supreme Court and Judicial Choice

The Role of Provisional Review in a Democracy

Paul R. Dimond

University of Michigan Press, 1989

The conventional wisdom holds that the Supreme Court provides the final word as the Court tells the people what the Constitution commands. In interpreting uncertain constitutional text, however, the Court is not provided with a single answer but must, itself, make hard choices. Such choices by an unelected Court appear to conflict with the basic principle of majority rule by the people through their elected representatives in our democracy. Over time, through public debate, new arguments before the Court, legislation, new appointments to the Court, and constitutional amendments, however, the Court's prior judgements evolve, are distinguished or modified, and are even directly overturned. Viewed from this longer term perspective, the Court's supposedly final rulings can therefore be seen as an integral part of an ongoing national dialogue over the meaning of the Constitution. This understanding makes judicial review more consistent with our tradition of government by the people rather than by the Court. To explore this understanding, The Supreme Court and Judicial Choice develops a provisional approach to judicial review under which a surprisingly large number of judicial rulings would be subject to modification by ordinary legistlation enacted by Congress. Far from rendering the Court a powerless subject of Congress, this proposal would enhance the vital role of the Court in stimulating and shaping the ongoing dialogue with the people over the meaning of the Constitution.
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cover of The Myth of Coequal Branches: Restoring the Constitution’s Separation of Functions

The Myth of Coequal Branches

Restoring the Constitution’s Separation of Functions

David J. Siemers

University of Missouri Press, 2026

The idea that the three branches of U.S. government are equal in power is taught in classrooms, proclaimed by politicians, and referenced in the media. But, as David Siemers shows, that idea is a myth, neither intended by the Founders nor true in practice. Siemers explains how adherence to this myth normalizes a politics of gridlock, in which the action of any branch can be checked by the reaction of any other. The Founders, however, envisioned a separation of functions rather than a separation of powers. Siemers argues that this view needs to replace our current view, so that the goals set out in the Constitution’s Preamble may be better achieved.
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cover of The Myth of the Imperial Presidency: How Public Opinion Checks the Unilateral Executive

The Myth of the Imperial Presidency

How Public Opinion Checks the Unilateral Executive

Dino P. Christenson and Douglas L. Kriner

University of Chicago Press, 2020

Throughout American history, presidents have shown a startling power to act independently of Congress and the courts. On their own initiative, presidents have taken the country to war, abolished slavery, shielded undocumented immigrants from deportation, declared a national emergency at the border, and more, leading many to decry the rise of an imperial presidency. But given the steep barriers that usually prevent Congress and the courts from formally checking unilateral power, what stops presidents from going it alone even more aggressively?  The answer, Dino P. Christenson and Douglas L. Kriner argue, lies in the power of public opinion.

With robust empirical data and compelling case studies, the authors reveal the extent to which domestic public opinion limits executive might. Presidents are emboldened to pursue their own agendas when they enjoy strong public support, and constrained when they don’t, since unilateral action risks inciting political pushback, jeopardizing future initiatives, and further eroding their political capital. Although few Americans instinctively recoil against unilateralism, Congress and the courts can sway the public’s view via their criticism of unilateral policies. Thus, other branches can still check the executive branch through political means. As long as presidents are concerned with public opinion, Christenson and Kriner contend that fears of an imperial presidency are overblown.
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cover of The Pursuit of Happiness in the Founding Era: An Intellectual History

The Pursuit of Happiness in the Founding Era

An Intellectual History

Carli N. Conklin

University of Missouri Press, 2020

Scholars have long debated the meaning of the pursuit of happiness, yet have tended to define it narrowly, focusing on a single intellectual tradition, and on the use of the term within a single text, the Declaration of Independence. In this insightful volume, Carli Conklin considers the pursuit of happiness across a variety of intellectual traditions, and explores its usage in two key legal texts of the Founding Era, the Declaration and William Blackstone’s Commentaries on the Laws of England.

For Blackstone, the pursuit of happiness was a science of jurisprudence, by which his students could know, and then rightly apply, the first principles of the Common Law. For the founders, the pursuit of happiness was the individual right to pursue a life lived in harmony with the law of nature and a public duty to govern in accordance with that law. Both applications suggest we consider anew how the phrase, and its underlying legal philosophies, were understood in the founding era. With this work, Conklin makes important contributions to the fields of early American intellectual and legal history.

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