Rogers Smith describes the adverse influence of modern liberalism's governing ideas on the development of American constitutional law and offers a new, more purposive theory to suit contemporary needs. He begins with a fresh analysis of the liberal goals shared by America's constitutional framers and points out the weaknesses of their political thought. Examining vital constitutional doctrines of due process, free speech, voting apportionment, and economic welfare, he demonstrates how contemporary law is often an incoherent patchwork of principles drawn from different historic versions of liberalism.

Smith considers and discards the major modern theories in political philosophy that bear on constitutional law: the democratic relativism of Alexander Bickel and John Hart Ely, the higher-law views inherited from America's religious traditions, and the neo-Kantian liberalism of Ronald Dworkin and John Rawls. Returning instead to the early liberalism of John Locke, he suggests how a theory centered on the Enlightenment commitment to promoting human capacities for reflective self-direction, or “rational liberty,” might better guide current constitutional debates.

Rogers Smith describes the adverse influence of modern liberalism's governing ideas on the development of American constitutional law and offers a new, more purposive theory to suit contemporary needs. He begins with a fresh analysis of the liberal goals shared by America's constitutional framers and points out the weaknesses of their political thought. Examining vital constitutional doctrines of due process, free speech, voting apportionment, and economic welfare, he demonstrates how contemporary law is often an incoherent patchwork of principles drawn from different historic versions of liberalism.

Smith considers and discards the major modern theories in political philosophy that bear on constitutional law: the democratic relativism of Alexander Bickel and John Hart Ely, the higher-law views inherited from America's religious traditions, and the neo-Kantian liberalism of Ronald Dworkin and John Rawls. Returning instead to the early liberalism of John Locke, he suggests how a theory centered on the Enlightenment commitment to promoting human capacities for reflective self-direction, or “rational liberty,” might better guide current constitutional debates.

Although constitutional law is supposed to be fixed and enduring, its central narrative in the twentieth century has been one of radical reinterpretation--Brown v. Board of Education, Roe v. Wade, Bush v. Gore. What, if anything, justifies such radical reinterpretation? How does it work doctrinally? What, if anything, structures it or limits it?

Jed Rubenfeld finds a pattern in American constitutional interpretation that answers these questions convincingly. He posits two different understandings of how constitutional rights would apply or not apply to particular legislation. One is that a right would be violated if certain laws were passed. The other is that a right would not be violated. He calls the former "Application Understandings" and the latter "No-Application Understandings." He finds that constitutional law has almost always adhered to all of the original Application Understandings, but where it has departed from history, as it did in the Brown decision, it has departed from No-Application Understandings. Specifically, the Fourteenth Amendment did not prohibit racial segregation, so Rubenfeld argues that the Supreme Court had no problem reinterpreting it to prohibit it. It was a No-Application Understanding.

This is a powerful argument that challenges current theories of constitutional interpretation from Bork to Dworkin. It rejects simplistic originalism, but restores historicity to constitutional theorizing.