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3 books about International courts
3 books about International courts
Delivering on Promises
The Domestic Politics of Compliance in International Courts
Lauren J. Peritz
University of Chicago Press, 2022
A timely investigation into the conditions that make international agreements—and the institutions that enforce them—vulnerable.
When do international institutions effectively promote economic cooperation among countries and help them resolve conflict? Although the international system lacks any central governing authority, states have created rules, particularly around international economic relations, and empowered international tribunals to enforce those rules. Just how successful are these institutions? In Delivering on Promises Lauren J. Peritz demonstrates that these international courts do indeed deliver results—but they are only effective under certain conditions.
As Peritz shows, states are less likely to comply with international rules and international court decisions when domestic industries have the political ability to obstruct compliance in particular cases. The author evaluates the argument with an extensive empirical analysis that traces the domestic politics of compliance with the decisions of two international economic courts: the World Trade Organization’s dispute settlement mechanism and the Court of Justice of the European Union. At a time when international agreements are under attack, this book sheds light on the complex relationship between domestic politics and international economic cooperation, offering detailed evidence that international economic courts are effective at promoting interstate cooperation.
When do international institutions effectively promote economic cooperation among countries and help them resolve conflict? Although the international system lacks any central governing authority, states have created rules, particularly around international economic relations, and empowered international tribunals to enforce those rules. Just how successful are these institutions? In Delivering on Promises Lauren J. Peritz demonstrates that these international courts do indeed deliver results—but they are only effective under certain conditions.
As Peritz shows, states are less likely to comply with international rules and international court decisions when domestic industries have the political ability to obstruct compliance in particular cases. The author evaluates the argument with an extensive empirical analysis that traces the domestic politics of compliance with the decisions of two international economic courts: the World Trade Organization’s dispute settlement mechanism and the Court of Justice of the European Union. At a time when international agreements are under attack, this book sheds light on the complex relationship between domestic politics and international economic cooperation, offering detailed evidence that international economic courts are effective at promoting interstate cooperation.
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Strengthening International Courts
The Hidden Costs of Legalization
Leslie Johns
University of Michigan Press, 2015
As all manner of commerce becomes increasingly global, states must establish laws to protect property rights, human rights, and national security. In many cases, states delegate authority to resolve disputes regarding these laws to an independent court, whose power depends upon its ability to enforce its rulings.
Examining detailed case studies of the International Court of Justice and the transition from the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade to the World Trade Organization, Leslie Johns finds that a court’s design has nuanced and mixed effects on international cooperation. A strong court is ideal when laws are precise and the court is nested within a political structure like the European Union. Strong courts encourage litigation but make states more likely to comply with agreements when compliance is easy and withdraw from agreements when it is difficult. A weak court is optimal when law is imprecise and states can easily exit agreements with minimal political or economic repercussions. Johns concludes the book with recommendations for promoting cooperation by creating more precise international laws and increasing both delegation and obligation to international courts.
Examining detailed case studies of the International Court of Justice and the transition from the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade to the World Trade Organization, Leslie Johns finds that a court’s design has nuanced and mixed effects on international cooperation. A strong court is ideal when laws are precise and the court is nested within a political structure like the European Union. Strong courts encourage litigation but make states more likely to comply with agreements when compliance is easy and withdraw from agreements when it is difficult. A weak court is optimal when law is imprecise and states can easily exit agreements with minimal political or economic repercussions. Johns concludes the book with recommendations for promoting cooperation by creating more precise international laws and increasing both delegation and obligation to international courts.
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Systems of Control in International Adjudication and Arbitration
Breakdown and Repair
W. Michael Reisman
Duke University Press, 1992
In a world where nations are increasingly interdependent and where their problems--whether environmental, economic, or military--have a global dimension, the resolution of international disputes has become critically important. In Systems of Control in International Adjudication and Arbitration, W. Michael Reisman, one of America's foremost scholars and practitioners of international law, examines the controls that govern arbitration—a method of alternative, private, and relatively unsupervised dispute resolution—and shows how these controls have broken down.
Reisman considers three major forms of international arbitration: in the International Court; under the auspices of the World Bank; and under the New York Convention of 1958. He discusses the unique structures of control in each situation as well as the stresses they have sustained. Drawing on extensive research and his own experience as a participant in the resolution of some of the disputes discussed, Reisman analyzes recent key decisions, including: Australia and New Zealand's attempt to stop France's nuclear testing in Muroroa; AMCO vs. Republic of Indonesia, concerning the construction of a large tourist hotel in Asia; and numerous others.
Reisman explores the implications of the breakdown of control systems and recommends methods of repair and reconstruction for each mode of arbitration. As a crucial perspective and an invaluable guide, this work will benefit both scholars and practitioners of international dispute resolution.
Reisman considers three major forms of international arbitration: in the International Court; under the auspices of the World Bank; and under the New York Convention of 1958. He discusses the unique structures of control in each situation as well as the stresses they have sustained. Drawing on extensive research and his own experience as a participant in the resolution of some of the disputes discussed, Reisman analyzes recent key decisions, including: Australia and New Zealand's attempt to stop France's nuclear testing in Muroroa; AMCO vs. Republic of Indonesia, concerning the construction of a large tourist hotel in Asia; and numerous others.
Reisman explores the implications of the breakdown of control systems and recommends methods of repair and reconstruction for each mode of arbitration. As a crucial perspective and an invaluable guide, this work will benefit both scholars and practitioners of international dispute resolution.
[more]
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