This volume explores commercial relations between the United States and China from the eighteenth century until 1949, fleshing out with facts the romantic and shadowy image of "the China trade." These nine chapters by specialists in the field have developed from papers they presented at a conference supported by the national Committee on American-East Asian Relations.

The work begins with an Introduction by John K. Fairbank, then moves on to analysis of the old China trade up to the American Civil War, centering on traditional Chinese exports of tea and silk. A second section deals with American imports into China--cotton textiles and textile-related goods, cigarettes, kerosene. Finally, the impact of the trade on both countries is assessed and the operations of American-owned and multinational companies in China are examined. For both the United States and China, the economic importance of the trade proves to have been less than the legend might suggest.

In January 1973, for the first time in American history, principal participants in a major election met to discuss the science and the art of campaign strategy: the planning, calculation, contrivance, miscalculation, and mischance that determine what the electorate sees. Here campaign managers, pollsters, and journalists met to compare notes on their techniques and tactics and on their successes and failures as they reviewed the events of the primaries and election:

the poor decisions made in the face of complex state primary laws;

the decline of Muskie and the rise of McGovern;

the significance of issues versus Nixon's image;

the effects of party reform on the Democratic convention;

the credentials fights;

the twists of strategy during the final months of the campaign;

the way the press covered the campaign and how reporters were treated by the various staffs;

the lessons for 1976 drawn by reporters and campaign people.

The straightforward exchanges took place at the Harvard Conference on Campaign Decision-Making. Eighteen key people participated, including those in the campaigns of Nixon, McGovern, Wallace, Muskie, Humphrey, Jackson, and McCloskey. Four political correspondents--David Broder, James Naughton, Al Otten, and James Perry--expertly guided the conversation, probing for additional insights.

The transcript of the conference--oral history at its best--has been carefully edited and makes absorbing reading. Included are brief sketches of the participants, a chronology of major events of the campaign, tables of campaign statistics, and a full index.

In 1944, as the end of World War II approached, an important series of talks was held to plan the formation of postwar international institutions. The site for the conversations was Dumbarton Oaks in Washington, DC, a research institute administered by Harvard University. In a spirit of optimism, Secretary of State Cordell Hull said that the purpose was “to create the institutional foundations for a just and enduring peace,” while Soviet ambassador Andrei Gromyko spoke of an international organization that would “guarantee for the peoples peace, security, and prosperity in the future.” The meetings, which included debates on a variety of issues, were a first step toward the creation of the United Nations.

In 1994, the “Dumbarton Oaks Conference, 1944–1994” brought together scholars and policymakers who have been involved with the study of international organizations or have played important roles in them. The conference papers in this volume examine both the formation of the United Nations and a number of current issues, including human rights, collective economic sanctions, peacekeeping operations, and the evolution of the role of the Secretary-General.

October 1962: the United States and the Soviet Union stood eyeball to eyeball, each brandishing enough nuclear weapons to obliterate civilization in the Northern Hemisphere. It was one of the most dangerous moments in world history. Day by day, for two weeks, the inner circle of President Kennedy's National Security Council debated what to do, twice coming to the brink of attacking Soviet military units in Cuba--units equipped for nuclear retaliation. And through it all, unbeknownst to any of the participants except the President himself, tape was rolling, capturing for posterity the deliberations that might have ended the world as we know it.



These are the full and authenticated transcripts of those audio recordings. Arguably the most important document in the history of the Cuban missile crisis, these transcripts are also a unique window on a drama rarely if ever witnessed by those outside the halls of power: the moment-by-moment decisionmaking of those with the fate of the West in their hands in a constantly changing, world-threatening situation. At the center of it all is President Kennedy, wary of experts after the debacle of the Bay of Pigs, puzzled and distrustful after confrontations with Khrushchev in Vienna and Berlin, and ever mindful of the responsibility symbolized by the satchel his military aides hold nearby, containing the codes to unleash nuclear warfare.



In one brief segment, midway through the crisis, the President, alone, speaks his thoughts into the machine. In others, he copes with hawks from Capitol Hill and the Pentagon. And in the last meeting, we hear him explaining and defending the formula that finally defused the crisis. With him throughout are his team from the State Department, including Secretary Dean Rusk, Under Secretary George Ball, and Llewellyn Thompson; his Defense team, especially Robert McNamara; his key assistants, Theodore Sorenson and McGeorge Bundy; Secretary of the Treasury Douglas Dillon; Vice President Lyndon Johnson; and, of course, his brother Robert, the Attorney General. All are identified and put into their proper context by the editors, whose introduction makes sense of this singular drama within the history of the Cold War and the Kennedy administration and whose conclusions will shape our understanding of the Cold War.

In an extraordinary display of the historical imagination at work, Ernest May has reinterpreted the genesis of the Monroe Doctrine and written an exceptional study of the relationship of policymakers to political structure. The author shows how domestic politics, more especially the upcoming 1824 presidential election, dictated the content and meaning of the Monroe Doctrine. May accomplishes his task by systematically examining the ideological perceptions of American policymakers and the foreign policies of Great Britain, France, and Russia. He concludes that the policymakers had wide freedom of choice. He then makes a searching study of United States internal politics and finds that there were no interest group pressures influencing decision-makers—it was an era of non-issues. Effectively eliminating the usual forces that shape foreign policy, the author develops a subtle and sophisticated case for the controlling power of presidential politics. May builds a case of relentless logic, giving us a historical reconstruction that is as fascinating in its unfolding as it is convincing in its assumptions and conclusions.