A reappraisal of classic arms control theory that advocates for reprioritizing deterrence over disarmament in a new era of nuclear multipolarity

The United States faces a new era of nuclear arms racing for which it is conceptually unprepared. Great power nuclear competition is seemingly returning with a vengeance as the post–Cold War international order morphs into something more uncertain, complicated, and dangerous. In this unstable third nuclear age, legacy nonproliferation and disarmament instruments designed for outmoded conditions are ill-equipped to tame the complex dynamics of a multipolar nuclear arms race centered on China, Russia, and the United States.

International relations scholar David A. Cooper proposes relearning, reviving, and adapting classic arms control theory and negotiating practices to steer the world away from threatening and destabilizing nuclear arms races. He surveys the history of nuclear arms control efforts, revisits strategic theory’s view of nuclear competition dynamics, and interviews US nuclear policy practitioners about both the past and the emerging era. To prepare for this third nuclear age, Cooper recommends adapting the Cold War’s classical paradigm of adversarial arms control for the contemporary landscape. Rather than prioritizing disarmament to eliminate nuclear weapons, this neoclassical approach would pursue pragmatic agreements to stabilize deterrence relationships among today’s nuclear rivals. Drawing on an extensive theoretical and practical study of the Cold War and its aftermath, Cooper distills relevant lessons that could inform the United States’ long-term efforts to navigate the unprecedented dangers of nuclear multipolarity.

Diverging from other recent books on the topic, Arms Control for the Third Nuclear Age provides analysts with a more hard-nosed strategic approach. In this very different era of great power rivalry, this book will be a must-read for scholars, students, and practitioners of nuclear arms control.

India's nuclear profile, doctrine, and practices have evolved rapidly since the country’s nuclear breakout in 1998. However, the outside world's understanding of India's doctrinal debates, forward-looking strategy, and technical developments are still two decades behind the present. India and Nuclear Asia will fill that gap in our knowledge by focusing on the post-1998 evolution of Indian nuclear thought, its arsenal, the triangular rivalry with Pakistan and China, and New Delhi's nonproliferation policy approaches. Yogesh Joshi and Frank O'Donnell show how India's nuclear trajectory has evolved in response to domestic, regional, and global drivers.

The authors argue that emerging trends in all three states are elevating risks of regional inadvertent and accidental escalation. These include the forthcoming launch of naval nuclear forces within an environment of contested maritime boundaries; the growing employment of dual-use delivery vehicles; and the emerging preferences of all three states to employ missiles early in a conflict. These dangers are amplified by the near-absence of substantive nuclear dialogue between these states, and the growing ambiguity of regional strategic intentions.  

Based on primary-source research and interviews, this book will be important reading for scholars and students of nuclear deterrence and India's international relations, as well as for military, defense contractor, and policy audiences both within and outside South Asia.

Once dismissed as ineffectual, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has in the past twenty years emerged as a powerful international organization. Member states allow the IAEA to render judgment on matters vital to peace and security while nations around the globe comply with its rules and commands on proliferation, safety, and a range of other issues.

Robert L. Brown details the IAEA’s role in facilitating both control of nuclear weapons and the safe exploitation of nuclear power. As he shows, the IAEA has acquired a surprising amount of power as states, for political and technological reasons, turn to it to supply policy cooperation and to act as an agent for their security and safety. The agency’s success in gaining and holding authority rests in part on its ability to apply politically neutral expertise that produces beneficial policy outcomes. But Brown also delves into the puzzle of how an agency created by states to aid cooperation has acquired power over them.

Does state acquisition of nuclear weapons lead to stability and peace or instability and crises? This is one of the great debates in international relations scholarship. Michael D. Cohen argues that nuclear weapons acquisition often does dangerously embolden the acquiring state to undertake coercion and aggression, but that this behavior moderates over time as leaders learn the dangers and limitations of nuclear coercion. This book examines the historical cases of the Soviet Union and Pakistan in depth and also looks at mini-cases involving the United States, China, and India. This book broadens our understanding of how leaders and states behave when they acquire nuclear weapons and is important reading for scholars and students of international relations, security studies, and political psychology.