People’s Wars in China, Malaya, and Vietnam explains why some insurgencies collapse after a military defeat while under other circumstances insurgents are able to maintain influence, rebuild strength, and ultimately defeat the government. The author argues that ultimate victory in civil wars rests on the size of the coalition of social groups established by each side during the conflict. When insurgents establish broad social coalitions (relative to the incumbent), their movement will persist even when military defeats lead to loss of control of territory because they enjoy the support of the civilian population and civilians will not defect to the incumbent. By contrast, when insurgents establish narrow coalitions, civilian compliance is solely a product of coercion. Where insurgents implement such governing strategies, battlefield defeats translate into political defeats and bring about a collapse of the insurgency because civilians defect to the incumbent. The empirical chapters of the book consist of six case studies of the most consequential insurgencies of the 20th century including that led by the Chinese Communist Party from 1927 to 1949, the Malayan Emergency (1948–1960), and the Vietnam War (1960–1975). People’s Wars breaks new ground in systematically analyzing and comparing these three canonical cases of insurgency. The case studies of China and Malaya make use of Chinese-language archival sources, many of which have never before been used and provide an unprecedented level of detail into the workings of successful and unsuccessful insurgencies. The book adopts an interdisciplinary approach and will be of interest to both political scientists and historians.
For most Americans in the 1960s, Vietnam was a faraway land of which they had little or no knowledge. Yet soon, hundreds of thousands of young American men and women would find themselves on the other side of the globe, fighting—and, in many cases, living—with the Vietnamese people. To lessen the culture shock, the Department of Defense prepared A Pocket Guide to Vietnam, 1962, a remarkably compact and surprisingly timeless crash course in Vietnamese culture for visitors to this foreign land.
"Internal war does not create politics or processes of government. This is likely to be the most tragic aspect of the war in Vietnam. When the guns are silent, the political analyst will find essentially the same political forces and governmental institutions intact as when the conflict began."
Politics in War deals mainly with the years 1967-1970 but bears on the problems South Vietnam faces now that American forces are no longer active. The book provides an understanding of Vietnamese politics, the forces underlying it, and the bases upon which political community and a future political settlement might be achieved.
Mr. Goodman has based his analysis on first-hand research. He conducted over 300 interviews with Vietnamese political leaders and government officials. His field work in South Vietnam encompassed three years and he presents materials from such sources as South Vietnam's National Assembly, its Ministry of Interior, and the U.S. Department of State's Vietnam Working Group.
Politics in War presents the untold story of how the Vietnamese saw the period of deepest American involvement. Goodman supplies background material on the Thieu government, its motivations, and its response to the people.
Students of politics who have been concerned about what the Vietnam involvement meant to America can now better assess what the last decade has meant to the Vietnamese.
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