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The basic distinctions McInerny introduces, his criticism of the central piece in the literature, Cajetan's De nominum analogia, the applications he makes to problems such as that of the nature of metaphysics or of logic, his knowledge of contemporary debates on related topics, combine to make his contribution unique

Aquinas and the Platonist Tradition studies a variety of central topics to illustrate the pervasive influence of Platonism and Neoplatonism in the philosophy of St Thomas. The overall thesis is that Aquinas combined the transcendent impulse of Platonism with the natural sensibility of Aristotle; his deepest metaphysical intuitions are unmistakably Platonist. While Aquinas followed Aristotle in epistemology, his deeper insights were more in tune with Plato. Adopting Aristotle’s method, he provided a more secure foundation for positions that was more characteristic of Plato. Fran O'Rourke notes the fundamental unity of Plato and Aristotle fashioned by Aquinas at a deeper level. The opening chapter deals in broad strokes with themes common to Plato and St Thomas. Direct influence is not always evident (Aquinas had limited knowledge of Plato’s writings), rather a shared interest in profound philosophical questions, approached separately on converging paths. Subsequent chapters deal in detail with particular questions, relying frequently on indirect Neoplatonic sources and interpretations, in particular St Augustine, Pseudo-Dionysius, and the author of the Liber de Causis. Central topics include the immortality of the soul, the nature of beauty, the status of evil, the names of God, Aquinas’ debt to Pseudo-Dionysius in the understanding of being/existence (esse) as intensive power (virtus essendi), the knowledge of transcendent reality, and the nature and ontological status of angels. O'Rourke's method is to begin each topic with a close reading of relevant texts from the entire corpus thomisticum. There followed a comparison and contrast with earlier authors and references to later influences. Each essay concludes with an evaluation, frequently criticizing the arguments involved. The studies are not merely historical, but aim to show the abiding philosophical relevance of the Platonist and Thomistic thought. There is a dearth of extended studies of the Platonist/Neoplatonist heritage of Aquinas. Many books refer in a general way to these influences, but none in an extended or systematic manner. While this book is a collection of diverse essays, it has nevertheless a comprehensive unity. It presents many new insights regarding the fundamental significance of Platonist/Neoplatonist aspects of Aquinas’ thought.

Not much escapes the intellect and imagination of the Angelic Doctor, St. Thomas Aquinas. Whether it be love, children, education, moral reasoning, happiness or the proper dispositions for human existence, St. Thomas seems an expert in all of it. Crime and criminal conduct are no exceptions to this general tendency with him. Not only does he have much to say about it, what he relates is perpetually fresh and surely the bedrock of what is now taken for granted. In this short treatise, the focus targets St. Thomas’s criminal codification – his law of crimes.

Indeed the magnanimity of his crimes code is a subject matter not yet treated in any detail in the scholarly literature. While parts and pieces are covered in many quarters, the literature has yet to develop a systematic, codified examination of Thomistic criminal law. The essence of the endeavor is threefold: first, how does St. Thomas factor the nature of the human person into the concept of criminal culpability and personal responsibility; second, what types of criminal conduct does St. Thomas specifically delineate and define; and lastly, what is Thomas’s view of mitigation and defense, as well as the corresponding punishment meted out for criminal conduct? This short commentary zeroes in on Thomistic Criminal Law – a project which will illuminate the root, the heritage and the foundation of modern criminal codification.

Aquinas on Emotion’s Participation in Reason aims to present Aquinas’s answer to the perennial and now popular question: In what way can the emotions be rational? For Aquinas, the starting point of this inquiry is Aristotle’s claim (EN. I. 13) that there are three parts to the soul: 1) the rational part, 2) the non-rational part which can participate in reason, and 3) the non-rational part that does not participate in reason. It is the extent to which the second part (the sense appetites, the seat of the emotions) participates in reason that the emotions can become rational. However, immediately after Aristotle introduces his tripartite division of the soul, he warns that one need not delve into the details of the division or the participation. Aquinas, however, ignores Aristotle, and uses his precise metaphysics of participation within in his sophisticated anthropology to great effect in his ethics. Unlike Aristotle, to fully understand Aquinas’s thinking on how the emotions can become rational, we simply must delve into the kinds of precisions that Aristotle thinks are misplaced. When Aquinas’s views emerge from these precisions, he has a surprisingly level-headed and commonsense view of how the emotions can become rational. On this point, he is more pessimistic than Aristotle and more optimistic than Kant; he is certainly not, as is he is often thought to be, the faithful follower of Aristotle and the polar opposite of Kant. Nicholas Kahm argue that Aquinas has a realistic and plausible view of how far reason can go in shaping our emotions. Furthermore, his plausible views can accommodate the serious current challenge raised against virtue ethics from social psychology. The method has mainly been a careful reading of primary texts, but unlike the rest of the scholarship on Aquinas’s ethics, Kahm is particularly sensitive to Aquinas’s historical and philosophical development.

Aquinas on Imitation of Nature highlights and explores the doctrine of the imitation of nature, a crucial aspect of Aquinas’ metaethics and fills the gap in research on Aquinas’ moral doctrine and theory of action. It conveys Aquinas’ doctrine of the imitation of nature as a natural feature of right practical reason regarding moral thinking and action, indeed as an indispensable feature of virtuous flourishing in individual and communal aspects of human life. The book starts with an overview of some of recent interpretations of Aquinas’ moral doctrine and natural law, introducing the need to explore the role of the imitation of nature in human practical reasoning and action in this area of Aquinas’ teaching. The chapters that follow are based on a careful reading of selected texts of Aquinas, and gradually develop a thorough and comprehensive picture of his doctrine of the imitation of nature as a source of practical principles. The final chapter provides various examples of how Aquinas understands the imitation of nature in the realm of moral reasoning and action. The originality of this volume comes from its account of Aquinas’ medieval doctrine of the imitation of nature, in light of which the principles of right practical reason and virtuous action are congruent with and epistemologically dependant upon the basic terms of the movements of natural, sensible, non-rational agents. Through its thorough reading of Aquinas on the imitation of nature, the book aims to open new ways of appropriation of the metaphysical and natural tenets of his moral doctrine in the areas of theory of action, practical reason, natural law, and contemporary virtue ethics.

The long twelfth century, from the seizure of the throne by Alexius I Comnenus in 1081, to the sack of Constantinople by the Fourth Crusade in 1204, is a period recognized as fostering the most brilliant cultural development in Byzantine history, especially in its literary production. It was a time of intense creativity as well as of rising tensions, and one for which literary approaches are a lively area in current scholarship. This study focuses on the prose dialogues in Greek from this period—of very varying kinds—and on what they can tell us about the society and culture of an era when western Europe was itself developing a new culture of schools, universities, and scholars. Yet it was also the period in which Byzantium felt the fateful impact of the Crusades, which ended with the momentous sack of Constantinople in 1204. Despite revisionist attempts to play down the extent of this disaster, it was a blow from which, arguably, the Byzantines never fully recovered.

Readers encountering the Middle English Arthurian tradition are confronted by three texts with confusingly similar titles: an anonymous poem in alliterative verse called Morte Arthure, an anonymous poem in eight-line stanzas entitled Le Morte Arthur, and Sir Thomas Malory’s influential prose Arthuriad, LeMorte Darthur [sic]. To add to the confusion, Malory made use of both English poems to augment his French sources in composing his Morte Darthur, so specialists often speak of two or more of these English Mortes in the same breath. Yet each Morte poem deserves to be studied on its own merits. 

Arthurian Intertextualities offers new readings of Malory’s Morte as well as the two English poems that most influenced him. Tolhurst and Whetter situate Malory’s Arthur story in the context of fourteenth- and fifteenth-century England. Combining these contexts with intertextual analysis of scenes and characters from Le Morte Darthur and both sources, the authors illustrate the full extent of Malory’s debt to these two English poems while making a stronger case for Malory’s artistry—and the stanzaic-poet’s artistry—than previous scholarship has acknowledged. These new readings demand a reassessment of Arthurian women, kingship, and warfare and heroism, including reconsidering the alliterative-poet’s attitude to war and to Arthur as conqueror. The authors also offer a spirited defense of Malory’s Guenevere, who remains frequently maligned by scholars, and argue for Palomydes’s acceptance by his Round Table Fellowship. Arthurian Intertextualities will appeal to readers who are interested in the book that serves as the source for most of the Arthuriana (whether novels, plays, works of art, or films) in today’s world: Le Morte Darthur.

A major new look at Africa’s influence on European culture and how colonization remade Africa in the image of a medieval Europe.
  
Virgil. Chaucer. Petrarch. These names resonate with many as cornerstones of European culture. Yet, in Atlas’s Bones, D. Vance Smith reveals that much of what is claimed as European culture up to the Middle Ages—its great themes in literature, its sources in political thought, its religious beliefs—originated in the writings of African thinkers like Augustine, Fulgentius, and Martianus Capella, or Europeans who thought extensively about Africa. In fact, a third of Virgil’s Aeneid takes place in Africa. Francis Petrarch believed his most important achievement was his epic Africa; while Geoffrey Chaucer wrote repeatedly about the figures of Scipio Africanus, actually two different men who defeated and destroyed Carthage.
 
Smith tells the story of how Europe created a false “medieval” version of Africa to acquire resources and power during the era of imperialism and colonialism. The first half of the book, “Reading Africa,” traces Egypt’s, Libya’s, and Carthage’s influence on classical and medieval thinking about Africa, highlighting often ignored literary and legendary traditions, for example, that Alexander the Great named himself the son of an African god. The second part, “Writing Africa,” focuses on how the different cultures of the two great African cities—Carthage and Alexandria—shaped modern literary criticism and political theology and examines the cross-influences of modern anthropology, medieval studies, and colonial law.
 
Atlas’s Bones firmly re-establishes the significance of Africa in European intellectual history. It will be essential reading for anyone seeking to understand how much of Africa informs our artistic and cultural world.