ABOUT THIS BOOKHow do persons live together in peace, prosperity, liberty, and justice? This ancient question requires continuing analysis, discussion, and attention – by economists, by philosophers, by political leaders, and by members of the body politic. Buchanan's interests have always centered on the issues relevant to this question, and his most recent essays reflect a new broadening of perspective. In this collection of twenty distinctly but closely related essays, written over the period 1986-89 following the author's receipt of the Nobel Prize in Economic Science, Professor Buchanan records his increasing interest in and developing ideas on the constitutional order of a free society, especially in its ethical foundations. The essays in this collection extend beyond the boundaries of economics into moral philosophy, political philosophy, methodology, and epistemology Many of the separate essays were initially delivered by special invitation as lectures to general audiences throughout the world. The linking theme of the essays in The Economics and the Ethics of Constitutional Order is the continuing relevance of Adam Smith's ideas to issues emerging in the 1990s – issues that have gained a new immediacy since the revolutionary events of 1989. How can societies organize their economies so as to produce goods and services efficiently while at the same time allowing individuals the liberties to make their own choices? Buchanan's contributions here are directly addressed to this question.
AUTHOR BIOGRAPHYJames M. Buchanan Jr. (1919–2013) was a Nobel Prize-winning American economist and political theorist who fundamentally reshaped the study of political decision-making through his development of public choice theory. After serving in the Navy during World War II, he earned his Ph.D. from the University of Chicago under the renowned economist Frank Knight. Buchanan built a distinguished academic career marked by influential faculty appointments at the University of Virginia, where he co-founded the Thomas Jefferson Center for Political Economy, as well as UCLA, Virginia Tech, and George Mason University, where he served as the director of the Center for Study of Public Choice. His revolutionary insights into institutional design, constitutional economics, and the analysis of non-market decision-making earned him the 1986 Nobel Prize in Economic Sciences.