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Managing the Counterrevolution: The United States and Guatemala, 1954–1961
Ohio University Press, 2000 eISBN: 978-0-89680-421-0 | Paper: 978-0-89680-215-5 Library of Congress Classification E183.8.G8S785 2000 Dewey Decimal Classification 303.4827307281
ABOUT THIS BOOK
ABOUT THIS BOOK
The Eisenhower administration's intervention in Guatemala is one of the most closely studied covert operations in the history of the Cold War. Yet we know far more about the 1954 coup itself than its aftermath. This book uses the concept of “counterrevolution” to trace the Eisenhower administration's efforts to restore U.S. hegemony in a nation whose reform governments had antagonized U.S. economic interests and the local elite. Comparing the Guatemalan case to U.S.-sponsored counterrevolutions in Iran, the Dominican Republic, Brazil, and Chile reveals that Washington's efforts to roll back “communism” in Latin America and elsewhere during the Cold War represented in reality a short-term strategy to protect core American interests from the rising tide of Third World nationalism. See other books on: 1945-1985 | 1953-1961 | Guatemala | Imperialism | Managing See other titles from Ohio University Press |
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Managing the Counterrevolution: The United States and Guatemala, 1954–1961
ABOUT THIS BOOK
Ohio University Press, 2000
eISBN: 978-0-89680-421-0
Paper: 978-0-89680-215-5
eISBN: 978-0-89680-421-0
Paper: 978-0-89680-215-5
The Eisenhower administration's intervention in Guatemala is one of the most closely studied covert operations in the history of the Cold War. Yet we know far more about the 1954 coup itself than its aftermath. This book uses the concept of “counterrevolution” to trace the Eisenhower administration's efforts to restore U.S. hegemony in a nation whose reform governments had antagonized U.S. economic interests and the local elite.
Comparing the Guatemalan case to U.S.-sponsored counterrevolutions in Iran, the Dominican Republic, Brazil, and Chile reveals that Washington's efforts to roll back “communism” in Latin America and elsewhere during the Cold War represented in reality a short-term strategy to protect core American interests from the rising tide of Third World nationalism.
Comparing the Guatemalan case to U.S.-sponsored counterrevolutions in Iran, the Dominican Republic, Brazil, and Chile reveals that Washington's efforts to roll back “communism” in Latin America and elsewhere during the Cold War represented in reality a short-term strategy to protect core American interests from the rising tide of Third World nationalism.
ABOUT THIS BOOK
