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BUY FROM PUBLISHER	Atlantis Lost: The American Experience with De Gaulle, 1958-1969 by Sebastian Reyn Amsterdam University Press, 2010 eISBN: 978-90-485-1211-9 \| Paper: 978-90-8964-214-1 Library of Congress Classification E183.8.F8R43 2010 Dewey Decimal Classification 970.98 ABOUT THIS BOOK \| AUTHOR BIOGRAPHY \| REVIEWS \| TOC ABOUT THIS BOOK During the 1960s, Charles de Gaulle’s greatest quarrel was with the Americans. The American attitude towards this forceful European leader was, however, an equally defining part of the dispute. In this riveting study of transatlantic international relations, Sebastian Reyn traces American responses to de Gaulle’s foreign policy from 1958 to 1969, concluding that how Americans judged de Gaulle depended largely on whether their politics leaned to the left or the right. AUTHOR BIOGRAPHY Sebastian Reyn is a senior civil servant at the Dutch Ministry of Defense. REVIEWS "Atlantis Lost is a painstakingly researched and balanced book that reaches a number of thought-provoking conclusions." — Presidential Studies Quarterly “Throughout, Reyn’s focus is on writing a detailed history of these various issues. But it would be wrong to think that he has produced merely a dry, traditional diplomatic history. […] The result is an impressive level of complexity, out of which Reyn draws two sets of conclusions. At the end of the book, Reyn points to his grand themes: the clash between de Gaulle’s conservatism and the generally liberal America of the 1960s; the lack of leverage of even such a powerful hegemon as the United States in this period; the fact that, while de Gaulle shifted European perceptions of America, his actions also altered the American view of the ‘Old World’, particularly by shattering the pre-1963 Atlanticist vision. But, at a more detailed level, Reyn also adds much to the literature. For instance, he reinforces the growing consensus that the private Kennedy was far more pragmatic than his lofty rhetoric suggested, and that Johnson was a savvier diplomatic tactician than was once thought. Or, to take another example, by exploring the differences between policies and day-to-day interactions on the one hand, and the clashing viewpoints within various administrations on the other, Reyn also sheds important light on how, for instance, the low-level anti-Gaullism of State Department officials during the Kennedy years made it difficult for the president to pursue his grand design. Overall, this is an excellent study which deserves to be read by anyone with an interest in US foreign policy of the period.” — Steven Casey, English Historical Review TABLE OF CONTENTS Acknowledgments Introduction Chapter One: Organizing the West: Eisenhower, Kennedy, and De Gaulle's 'Tripartite' Memorandum Proposal, 1958–1962 Chapter Two: Whose Kind of 'Europe'? Kennedy's Tug of War With De Gaulle About the Common Market, 1961–1962 Chapter Three: The Clash: Kennedy and De Gaulle's Rejection of the Atlantic Partnership, 1962–1963 Chapter Four: The Demise of the Last Atlantic Project: LBJ and De Gaulle's Attack on the Multilateral Force, 1963–1965 Chapter Five: De Gaulle Throws Down the Gauntlet: LBJ and the Crisis in NATO, 1965–1967 Chapter Six: Grand Designs Go Bankrupt: From Divergence to Accommodation, 1967–1969 Conclusion: Atlantis Lost: The Reception of Gaullism in the United States Notes Bibliography Abbreviations Index of persons Curriculum vitae See other books on: 1890-1970 \| 1953-1961 \| American Experience \| De Gaulle \| Gaulle, Charles de See other titles from Amsterdam University Press

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REVIEWS

"Atlantis Lost is a painstakingly researched and balanced book that reaches a number of thought-provoking conclusions."

— Presidential Studies Quarterly

“Throughout, Reyn’s focus is on writing a detailed history of these various issues. But it would be wrong to think that he has produced merely a dry, traditional diplomatic history. […] The result is an impressive level of complexity, out of which Reyn draws two sets of conclusions. At the end of the book, Reyn points to his grand themes: the clash between de Gaulle’s conservatism and the generally liberal America of the 1960s; the lack of leverage of even such a powerful hegemon as the United States in this period; the fact that, while de Gaulle shifted European perceptions of America, his actions also altered the American view of the ‘Old World’, particularly by shattering the pre-1963 Atlanticist vision. But, at a more detailed level, Reyn also adds much to the literature. For instance, he reinforces the growing consensus that the private Kennedy was far more pragmatic than his lofty rhetoric suggested, and that Johnson was a savvier diplomatic tactician than was once thought. Or, to take another example, by exploring the differences between policies and day-to-day interactions on the one hand, and the clashing viewpoints within various administrations on the other, Reyn also sheds important light on how, for instance, the low-level anti-Gaullism of State Department officials during the Kennedy years made it difficult for the president to pursue his grand design.

Overall, this is an excellent study which deserves to be read by anyone with an interest in US foreign policy of the period.”

— Steven Casey, English Historical Review