Long a major element of classical studies, the examination of the laws of the ancient Romans has gained momentum in recent years as interdisciplinary work in legal studies has spread. Two resulting issues have arisen, on one hand concerning Roman laws as intellectual achievements and historical artifacts, and on the other about how we should consequently conceptualize Roman law.

Drawn from a conference convened by the volume's editor at the American Academy in Rome addressing these concerns and others, this volume investigates in detail the Roman law of obligations—a subset of private law—together with its subordinate fields, contracts and delicts (torts). A centuries-old and highly influential discipline, Roman law has traditionally been studied in the context of law schools, rather than humanities faculties. This book opens a window on that world.

Roman law, despite intense interest in the United States and elsewhere in the English-speaking world, remains largely a continental European enterprise in terms of scholarly publications and access to such publications. This volume offers a collection of specialist essays by leading scholars Nikolaus Benke, Cosimo Cascione, Maria Floriana Cursi, Paul du Plessis, Roberto Fiori, Dennis Kehoe, Carla Masi Doria, Ernest Metzger, Federico Procchi, J. Michael Rainer, Salvo Randazzo, and Bernard Stolte, many of whom have not published before in English, as well as opening and concluding chapters by editor Thomas A. J. McGinn.

A groundbreaking challenge to a core principle of constitutional law, arguing that congressional action is not limited by the legislative branch’s textually enumerated powers.

Every law student learns that the federal government is constrained to act only according to its enumerated powers, meaning that Congress can do what the Constitution expressly authorizes it to and nothing more. Yet Richard Primus contends that this longstanding orthodoxy—allegedly required by the text of the Constitution, the Framers’ vision, and the logic of federalism—is fundamentally flawed.

Through careful analysis of constitutional text and history, and of the structure of American federalism, The Oldest Constitutional Question builds a powerful argument for broad congressional authority. In particular, Primus shows that the primary function of enumeration is to rule listed powers in, not to rule other powers out. The Framers were more worried that the federal government might be fragile and anemic than that it would be overwhelmingly strong. Enumerating congressional powers is thus best understood as a way of ensuring that the federal legislature has an incontestable warrant to exercise the powers specified there, not as an exhaustive description of all that Congress can do.

In practice, the enumeration of powers does little to limit Congress. But most constitutional lawyers—including many Supreme Court justices—think this means something has gone wrong, such that the courts must aggressively strike down federal laws exceeding Congress’s enumerated powers. Primus’s meticulous examination explodes the prevailing view, revealing its underlying errors. The constitutional system does place limits on Congress, and crucially so, but the enumeration of powers is not, and never has been, a sensible means for creating and enforcing those limits.

Harvard Law School is the oldest and, arguably, the most influential law school in the nation. U.S. presidents, Supreme Court justices, and foreign heads of state, along with senators, congressional representatives, social critics, civil rights activists, university presidents, state and federal judges, military generals, novelists, spies, Olympians, film and TV producers, CEOs, and one First Lady have graduated from the school since its founding in 1817.

During its first century, Harvard Law School pioneered revolutionary educational ideas, including professional legal education within a university, Socratic questioning and case analysis, and the admission and training of students based on academic merit. But the school struggled to navigate its way through the many political, social, economic, and legal crises of the century, and it earned both scars and plaudits as a result. On the Battlefield of Merit offers a candid, critical, definitive account of a unique legal institution during its first century of influence.

Daniel R. Coquillette and Bruce A. Kimball examine the school’s ties with institutional slavery, its buffeting between Federalists and Republicans, its deep involvement in the Civil War, its reluctance to admit minorities and women, its anti-Catholicism, and its financial missteps at the turn of the twentieth century. On the Battlefield of Merit brings the story of Harvard Law School up to 1909—a time when hard-earned accomplishment led to self-satisfaction and vulnerabilities that would ultimately challenge its position as the leading law school in the nation. A second volume will continue this history through the twentieth century.

This publication, issued in cooperation with the Selden Society, reproduces completely the Yale edition of 1915–1942, which has long been unobtainable. To it has been added an English translation, the first in almost a century, incorporating many improvements of the text, drawn from a re-examination of the manuscripts and a further identification of Henry de Bracton’s sources, Roman and English.

Volume I contains George E. Woodbine’s prolegomena to his edition, written in 1915, to which Samuel Thorne has added a prefatory note, reclassifying and redating the manuscripts on which the edition was based. Volume II begins the text and translation, which will be completed in Volume III and Volume IV. Notes and indices will appear in Volume V.

This publication, issued in cooperation with the Selden Society, reproduces completely the Yale edition of 1915–1942, which has long been unobtainable. To it has been added an English translation, the first in almost a century, incorporating many improvements of the text, drawn from a re-examination of the manuscripts and a further identification of Henry de Bracton’s sources, Roman and English.

Volume I contains George E. Woodbine’s prolegomena to his edition, written in 1915, to which Samuel Thorne has added a prefatory note, reclassifying and redating the manuscripts on which the edition was based. Volume II begins the text and translation, which will be completed in Volume III and Volume IV. Notes and indices will appear in Volume V.

This publication, issued in cooperation with the Selden Society, reproduces completely the Yale edition of 1915–1942, which has long been unobtainable. To it has been added an English translation, the first in almost a century, incorporating many improvements of the text, drawn from a re-examination of the manuscripts and a further identification of Henry de Bracton’s sources, Roman and English.

Volume I contains George E. Woodbine’s prolegomena to his edition, written in 1915, to which Samuel Thorne has added a prefatory note, reclassifying and redating the manuscripts on which the edition was based. Volume II begins the text and translation, which will be completed in Volume III and Volume IV. Notes and indices will appear in Volume V.

This publication, issued in cooperation with the Selden Society, reproduces completely the Yale edition of 1915–1942, which has long been unobtainable. To it has been added an English translation, the first in almost a century, incorporating many improvements of the text, drawn from a re-examination of the manuscripts and a further identification of Henry de Bracton’s sources, Roman and English.

Volume I contains George E. Woodbine’s prolegomena to his edition, written in 1915, to which Samuel Thorne has added a prefatory note, reclassifying and redating the manuscripts on which the edition was based. Volume II begins the text and translation, which will be completed in Volume III and Volume IV. Notes and indices will appear in Volume V.

The statesman on statecraft.

Cicero (Marcus Tullius, 106–43 BC), Roman lawyer, orator, politician, and philosopher, of whom we know more than of any other Roman, lived through the stirring era that saw the rise, dictatorship, and death of Julius Caesar in a tottering republic. In his political speeches especially and in his correspondence we see the excitement, tension, and intrigue of politics and the part he played in the turmoil of the time. Of about 106 speeches, delivered before the Roman people or the Senate if they were political, before jurors if judicial, fifty-eight survive (a few of them incompletely). In the fourteenth century Petrarch and other Italian humanists discovered manuscripts containing more than 900 letters of which more than 800 were written by Cicero and nearly 100 by others to him. These afford a revelation of the man all the more striking because most were not written for publication. Six rhetorical works survive and another in fragments. Philosophical works include seven extant major compositions and a number of others; and some lost. There is also poetry, some original, some as translations from the Greek.

The Loeb Classical Library edition of Cicero is in twenty-nine volumes.

Condemned to hang after his raid on Harper’s Ferry, John Brown prophesied that the crimes of a slave-holding land would be purged away only with blood. A study of omens, maledictions, and inspired invocations, The Oracle and the Curse examines how utterances such as Brown’s shaped American literature between the Revolution and the Civil War.

In nineteenth-century criminal trials, judges played the role of law’s living oracles, but offenders were also given an opportunity to address the public. When the accused began to turn the tables on their judges, they did so not through rational arguments but by calling down a divine retribution. Widely circulated in newspapers and pamphlets, these curses appeared to channel an otherworldly power, condemning an unjust legal system and summoning readers to the side of righteousness.

Exploring the modes of address that communicated the authority of law and the dictates of conscience in antebellum America’s court of public opinion, Caleb Smith offers a new poetics of justice which assesses the nonrational influence that these printed confessions, trial reports, and martyr narratives exerted on their first audiences. Smith shows how writers portrayed struggles for justice as clashes between human law and higher authority, giving voice to a moral protest that transformed American literature.

A Federalist Notable Book

“An important contribution to our understanding of the 14th Amendment.”
—Wall Street Journal

“By any standard an important contribution…A must-read.”
—National Review

“The most detailed legal history to date of the constitutional amendment that changed American law more than any before or since…The corpus of legal scholarship is richer for it.”
—Washington Examiner

Adopted in 1868, the Fourteenth Amendment profoundly changed the Constitution, giving the federal judiciary and Congress new powers to protect the fundamental rights of individuals from being violated by the states. Yet, the Supreme Court has long misunderstood or ignored the original meaning of its key Section I clauses.

Barnett and Bernick contend that the Fourteenth Amendment must be understood as the culmination of decades of debate about the meaning of the antebellum Constitution. In the course of this debate, antislavery advocates advanced arguments informed by natural rights, the Declaration of Independence, and the common law, as well as what is today called public-meaning originalism.

The authors show how these arguments and the principles of the Declaration in particular eventually came to modify the Constitution. They also propose workable doctrines for implementing the amendment’s key provisions covering the privileges and immunities of citizenship, due process, and equal protection under the law.

Originalism holds that the U.S. Constitution should be interpreted according to its meaning at the time it was enacted. In their innovative defense of originalism, John McGinnis and Michael Rappaport maintain that the text of the Constitution should be adhered to by the Supreme Court because it was enacted by supermajorities—both its original enactment under Article VII and subsequent Amendments under Article V. A text approved by supermajorities has special value in a democracy because it has unusually wide support and thus tends to maximize the welfare of the greatest number.

The authors recognize and respond to many possible objections. Does originalism perpetuate the dead hand of the past? How can following the original meaning be justified, given that African Americans and women were excluded from the enactment of the Constitution in 1787 and many of its subsequent Amendments? What is originalism’s place in interpretation of the Constitution, when after two hundred years there is so much non-originalist precedent?

A fascinating counterfactual they pose is this: had the Supreme Court not interpreted the Constitution so freely, perhaps the nation would have resorted to the Article V amendment process more often and with greater effect. Their book will be an important contribution to the literature on originalism, which is now the most prominent theory of constitutional interpretation.