Government spending has increased dramatically in the United States since World War II despite the many rules intended to rein in the insatiable appetite for tax revenue most politicians seem to share. Drawing on examples from the federal and state governments, Rules and Restraint explains in lucid, nontechnical prose why these budget rules tend to fail, and proposes original alternatives for imposing much-needed fiscal discipline on our legislators.

One reason budget rules are ineffective, David Primo shows, is that politicians often create and preserve loopholes to protect programs that benefit their constituents. Another reason is that legislators must enforce their own provisions, an arrangement that is seriously compromised by their unwillingness to abide by rules that demand short-term sacrifices for the sake of long-term gain. Convinced that budget rules enacted through such a flawed legislative process are unlikely to work, Primo ultimately calls for a careful debate over the advantages and drawbacks of a constitutional convention initiated by the states—a radical step that would bypass Congress to create a path toward change. Rules and Restraint will be required reading for anyone interested in institutional design, legislatures, and policymaking.

David Primo is assistant professor of political science at the University of Rochester and a coauthor of ThePlane Truth: Airline Crashes, the Media, and Transportation Policy.

“American democracy is replete with legal rules that restrict the power of elected officials. Rules and Restraint shows that many popular rules, such as balanced budget requirements and spending limits, are restraints in name only because no one can enforce them. With its blend of rigorous theory and evidence, this innovative book is required reading for reformers as well as scholars who want to understand why political institutions sometimes fail to live up to their promise, and how to make them more effective.”<John G. Matsusaka, University of Southern California>

"David Primo is motivated by the puzzle of why federal budgetary levels are unaffected by rules designed to restrain spending, and he wonders if rules can ever be effective. . . . His analysis cogently argues why rules and restraint are somewhat of an oxymoron at the congressional level. . . . Those seeking a study of legislative activity framed from an economic theory perspective may find this account quite useful for graduate classroom adoption."

"A substantial contribution to the existing literature on political institutions and fiscal limits. . . . By writing one of those rare books which should interest both political scientists and practitioners of politics, Primo has provided a very fine service for his readers."