Rules, Games, and Common-Pool Resources
by Elinor Ostrom, Roy Gardner and Jimmy Walker
University of Michigan Press, 1994
Cloth: 978-0-472-09546-9 | Paper: 978-0-472-06546-2
Library of Congress Classification HB846.5.O85 1994
Dewey Decimal Classification 333.7
Cloth: 978-0-472-09546-9 | Paper: 978-0-472-06546-2
Library of Congress Classification HB846.5.O85 1994
Dewey Decimal Classification 333.7
ABOUT THIS BOOK | TOC | REQUEST ACCESSIBLE FILE
ABOUT THIS BOOK
Explores ways that the tragedy of the commons can be avoided by people who use common-property resources
TABLE OF CONTENTS
- Contents
- Tables
- Figures
- Part 1.
- Theoretical Background
- Chapter 1.
- Rules, Games, and Common-Pool Resource Problems
- Common-Pool Resource Problems
- Conceptual Foundations and Key Terms
- Classifying CPR Situations: Appropriation and Provision
- CPR Situations and CPR Dilemmas
- Coordinated Strategies to Resolve CPR Dilemmas
- The Central Questions to Be Addressed
- The Plan for This Book
- Chapter 2.
- Institutional Analysis and Common-Pool Resources
- Models, Theories, and Frameworks
- Historical Roots of IAD
- The Institutional Analysis and Development Framework
- The Action Situation
- Actors
- Factors Affecting Action Arenas
- Linking Action Arenas
- Multiple Levels of Analysis
- Multiple Levels of Analysis and Solving Higher-Order Dilemmas
- Conclusions
- Chapter 3.
- Games Appropriators Play
- The Use of Formal Models
- CPR Games with Two Players and Two Strategies
- Repeated CPR Games
- Conclusions
- Chapter 4.
- Rules and Games
- How Rules Affect the Structure of a Game
- Some Empirical Examples of Changes in Authority Rules
- Fishing Rules and Fishing Games
- Outcome Comparison
- Conclusions
- Part 2.
- Experimental Studies
- Chapter 5.
- CPR Baseline Appropriation Experiments
- CPR Appropriation
- Appropriation Behavior in the Laboratory
- Conclusions
- Appendix 5.1.: CPR Provision Problems
- Zero Provision Environments and a Simple Contribution Mechanism
- Discrete Public Goods and VCM
- Discrete Public Goods and Alternative Contribution Mechanisms
- Appendix 5.2.: Experimental Numbers
- Appendix 5.3.: Market 2 Group Investment Decisions
- Chapter 6.
- Probabilistic Destruction of the CPR
- Model of a Destructible CPR
- Finite Deterministic Repetition of the Constituent Game
- The Experimental Design
- Experimental Results
- Conclusions
- Appendix 6.1.: Across Period Behavior: Tokens Invested in Market 2
- Chapter 7.
- Communication in the Commons
- Communication: Theoretical Issues
- One-Shot Costless Communication
- Repeated Costless Communication
- Costly Communication
- Conclusions
- Chapter 8.
- Sanctioning and Communication Institutions
- Sanctioning in the Constituent Game
- The Experimental Setting and Results
- Conclusions
- Chapter 9.
- Regularities from the Laboratory and Possible Explanations
- Why So Much Cooperation in Communication Experiments?
- Conclusions
- Part 3.
- Field Studies
- Chapter 10.
- Institutions and Performance in Irrigation Systems
- Tang, Shui Yan
- Comparing Irrigation Systems
- Performance Measures and Linkages among Action Arenas
- Matching Rules to Physical Domains
- Multiple Levels of Institutional Arrangements
- Monitoring and Enforcement Arrangements
- Conclusions
- Appendix 10.1.: Case Profiles
- Chapter 11.
- Fishers' Institutional Responses to Common-Pool Resource Dilemmas
- Schlager, Edella
- Coastal Fisheries as Common-Pool Resource Dilemmas
- CPR Dilemmas, Complexity, and Coastal Fisheries
- Fishers' Responses to CPR Dilemmas
- Commons Dilemmas and Organized Fishers
- Performance of Fishers' Organizations
- Conclusions
- Chapter 12.
- Rules, Rule Making, and Rule Breaking: Examining the Fit between Rule Systems and Resource Use
- Agrawal, Arun
- The Historical Context
- The Local Context
- Authority Rules Related to Allocation
- Monitoring
- Sanctioning
- Arbitration
- Conclusions
- Chapter 13.
- Changing Rules, Changing Games: Evidence from Groundwater Systems in Southern California
- Blomquist, William
- Groundwater Basins as Common-Pool Resources
- The Levels of Action
- Linked Action Arenas
- Operational-Level Rule Configurations
- Operational-Level Rules and Game Structure
- Rules, Actions, and Outcomes: Evidence from the Cases
- Conclusions
- Chapter 14.
- Regularities from the Field and Possible Explanations
- Blomquist, William
- Schlager, Edella
- Tang, Shui Yan
- Ostrom, Elinor
- Commonalities across Organized CPRs
- Differences across Organized CPRs
- Physical Characteristics That Make a Difference
- Conclusions
- Part 4.
- Conclusion
- Chapter 15.
- Cooperation and Social Capital
- Theoretical Choices in Doing Policy Analysis
- Surmounting CPR Dilemmas
- Bibliography
- Contributors
- Index
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