cover of book

Politics, Policy, and Organizations: Frontiers in the Scientific Study of Bureaucracy
edited by George Krause and Kenneth J. Meier
University of Michigan Press, 2003
Cloth: 978-0-472-11317-0 | Paper: 978-0-472-03114-6 | eISBN: 978-0-472-02404-9
Library of Congress Classification HD38.4.P65 2003
Dewey Decimal Classification 351

The bureaucracy is the fourth branch of government, often receiving attention in times of emergency or when it is the object of criticism from the media or politicians. Less understood is how bureaucratic institutions function in a democracy, both from an organizational perspective and as institutional participants within the political arena. Drawing on rational choice approaches, computationally intensive data and modeling techniques, and systematic empirical inquiry, this original collection of essays highlights the important role bureaucracies play in shaping public policy-making. The editors of and contributors to this volume demonstrate not only the constraints political officials face in harnessing the bureaucracy but, more important, how bureaucracies function as organizational entities in diverse contexts.
George A. Krause is Associate Professor of Political Science, University of South Carolina.
Kenneth J. Meier is Charles Puryear Professor of Liberal Arts and Professor of Political Science, Texas A&M University.
  • Contents 
    • Preface
    • The Scientific Study of Bureaucracy: An Overview
      • Meier, Kenneth J.
      • Krause, George A.
    • Part 1. 
    • Theory
      • Why Do Bureaucrats Delay? Lessons from a Stochastic Optimal Stopping Model of Agency Timing, with Applications to the FDA
        • Carpenter, Daniel P.
      • Agency Risk Propensities Involving the Demand for Bureaucratic Discretion
        • Krause, George A.
      • Veto Points, Policy Preferences, and Bureaucratic Autonomy in Democratic Systems
        • Hammond, Thomas H.
      • The Benefits of Agency Policy-making: Perspectives from Positive Theory
        • Spence, David B.
    • Part 2. 
    • Methodological Technology
      • Donut Shops, Speed Traps, and Paperwork: Supervision and the Allocation of Time to Bureaucratic Tasks
        • Brehm, John
        • Gates, Scott
        • Gomez, Brad
      • Adapting Agencies: Competition, Imitation, and Punishment in the Design of Bureaucratic Performance
        • Whitford, Andrew B.
    • Part 3. 
    • Empirical Studies
      • Consensual Rule Making and the Time It Takes to Develop Rules
        • Balla, Steven J.
        • Wright, John R.
      • Why It Matters Whether State Bureaucrats as Opposed to Federal Bureaucrats Administer Federal Programs
        • Keiser, Lael R.
      • Structural Choice and Political Control of Bureaucracy: Updating Federal Credit Programs
        • Corder, Kevin
      • Administrative Structure and Social Democratic Results: The Case of Education
        • Smith, Kevin B.
      • Bureaucratic Discretion and Regulatory Success without Enforcement
        • Licari, Michael J.
      • Conclusion: An Agenda for the Scientific Study of Bureaucracy
        • Meier, Kenneth J.
        • Krause, George A.
    • References
    • Contributors
    • Author Index
    • Subject Index

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