Contents
Foreword by Thomas C. Schelling
Preface, 2004: Old Patterns, New Lessons
Introduction
Part I: The Components of Surprise Attack
1. The Essence of Surprise Attack
Reaction to Disasters and Warnings
Aspects of Erroneous Estimates
The Strategic Warning
Surprise and Military Preparedness
2. Information and Indicators
Quality of Intelligence Information
Early Warning Indicators
Signal and Noise
Quantity of Intelligence Information
3. Intentions and Capabilities
Inference and Difficulties in Estimating Intentions
The Enemy’s Conceptual Framework
Risk Taking by the Enemy
Estimating Capabilities
Part II: Judgmental Biases and Intelligence Analysis
4. Conceptions and Incoming Information
The Set of Conceptions
The Persistence of Conceptions
Assimilating Information
Information and Expectations
Treating Discrepant Information
Cognitive Biases and Overconfidence
Prediction and Intelligence Analysis
Stages of Intelligence Analysis
Approaches for Generating and Evaluating Hypotheses
Analogies and Learning from History
Evaluating Incoming Information
Choosing among Alternative Hypotheses
External Obstacles to Perception
Changing a View
Part III: The Environment
6. The Analyst and the Small Group
The Other Opinion
Groupthink
Pressures for Conformity
The Leader and the Expert
Group Risk Taking
The Military as an Organization
Rivalry, Coordination, and Communication
Intrinsic Problems in the Intelligence Organization
Military Men and Surprise Attack
8. Intelligence and Decision Makers
Decision Makers and Intelligence Production
Commitment to a Policy
How Decision Makers Affect the Intelligence Process
Decision Makers and Surprise Attack
The Complexity of the Problem
Why Safeguards Usually Fail
War without Surprise?
Notes
Bibliography
Index